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INTRODUCTION
This case arises from the dismissal of a Petition to Modify a Decree of Divorce
and the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. About 13 months after Michael Stevens
(“Ex-Husband”) and Mary Ellen Robertson (“Ex-Wife”) were divorced, Ex-Husband
sought relief from the divorce court to prospectively enjoin the speech of Ex-Wife on a
preliminary and permanent basis, alleging that her speech was defamatory and an
invasion of his privacy. Ex-Wife opposed Ex-Husband’s motion for preliminary
injunctive relief and moved to dismiss his Petition to Modify under Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). The district court denied Ex-Husband’s request for preliminary injunctive relief
and granted the Motion to Dismiss. The district court reasoned that (1) the request for
preliminary injunctive relief should be denied on the merits because Ex-Husband made
no showing of a threat of immediate and irreparable harm; (2) both the motion and the
Petition to Modify addressed what amounted to tort claims that could not be litigated
within the parties’ divorce case;1 and (3) the Petition to Modify failed to allege a
substantial and material change in circumstances. This appeal followed.
While the district court properly denied the motion and dismissed Petition to
Modify, there was one additional reason that the district court failed to rule upon that
supports its conclusions—that granting Ex-Husband’s requested relief would amount to
an unconstitutional prior restraint on Ex-Wife’s speech. As detailed below, the district
court’s order should be affirmed on this alternative basis.

1

Ex-Husband filed a separate civil action against Ex-Wife for defamation and
invasion of privacy, which is pending in Second District Court, Civil No. 170902157.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
With respect to the dismissal of the petition to modify, the standard of review is de

novo. Rawcliffe v. Anciaux, 2017 UT 72, ¶ 8. With respect to the denial of preliminary
injunctive relief, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. Zagg, Inc. v. Harmer,
2015 UT App 52, ¶ 4.
II.

PRESERVATION
All issues and arguments set forth in this brief were addressed in multiple rounds

of briefing at the district court level and (See, e.g., April 5, 2017 Hearing Tr. 17:3 21:21.)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

Ex-Husband and Ex-Wife were divorced by the Utah Second District Court on

November 10, 2015, via stipulation. (See November 10, 2015 Decree of Divorce.)
2.

There were no children of the marriage. (Id. ¶ 5.)

3.

In connection with the divorce, the parties specifically negotiated the scope of a

non-disparagement clause. In that regard, the Decree of Divorce, at paragraph 22, states, “Nondisparagement. Mary Ellen shall not tell third parties that (1) Michael kicked her out of the
house, or (2) Michael has stolen marital assets.” (Id. ¶ 22.)
4.

On November 15, 2016, Ex-Husband filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of

Divorce, alleging that, since entry of the Decree of Divorce, Ex-Wife made statements that were
defamatory and invaded his privacy. 2 Ex-Husband also filed a Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order on the same day.
5.

The Petition to Modify and the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

requested broad prospective injunctive relief regarding Ex-Wife’s speech. For example, the
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order requested that Ex-Wife be enjoined as follows:
That [Ex-Wife] be restrained from making any statements regarding their
marriage or divorce or relationship to third parties which could cause [ExHusband] any embarrassment or humiliation or otherwise reflect negatively on the
[Ex-Husband] or cause the [Ex-Husband] to be held in a false light or in
disrepute.
That [Ex-Wife] shall not share any legal documents … or any other
communication arising out of this divorce action, including any specific details
about the final resolution or actions taken in the course of modifying the divorce
decree, with any third party except as follows: legal counsel for the parties,
2

While Ex-Wife denies that any statements she made are correctly characterized, in
context, and/or otherwise actionable, given the standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, Ex-Wife does not address those issues in this appeal.
6

immediate family, or when such disclosure is required by a subpoena … .
…[Ex-Wife] shall refrain from making any communication through any medium,
either orally, nonverbally or in writing … that may be construed as harmful,
embarrassing, humiliating or otherwise disparaging, or that defames, impugns,
damages or assails the reputation, casts in a misleading light or causes or tends to
cause the recipient of a communication to question the integrity, competence,
good character, professionalism, or reputation of [Ex-Husband’s] immediate
family members and/or any private third party and/or the employees or board
members of organizations with which [Ex-Husband] is connected … .
(November 15, 2016 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ¶¶ 1-3.)
6.

The Petition to Modify did not articulate a single change in circumstance. Rather,

the Petition to Modify merely set forth the unsupported conclusion that, “there has been
substantial and material changes in circumstances since the entry of the Decree not contemplated
in the Decree … .” (November 15, 2016 Petition to Modify, at 1.)

II.

DISTRICT COURT DISPOSITION
On December 6, 2016, the Honorable Commissioner Christina Wilson orally

recommended that Ex-Husband’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief be denied.
This recommendation was memorialized via written order entered by the Honorable
Ernest W. Jones December 20, 2016.
On March 7, 2017, the Honorable Commissioner Christina Wilson recommended
that Ex-Wife’s Motion to Dismiss be granted. This recommendation was memorialized
via written order entered by the Honorable Ernest W. Jones March 27, 2017.
On April 28, 2017, the Honorable Ernest W. Jones entered a final order entitled
“Order on Objections to Recommendation of Commissioner of December 6, 2016, and
March 7, 2017” in which he ordered that Ex-Husband’s motion for preliminary injunctive
relief be denied and Ex-Wife’s Motion to Dismiss be granted.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
To the extent Ex-Husband wishes to assert claims against Ex-Wife for any
statements she has made, Ex-Husband is free to do so, and actually has done so, by filing
a civil action just as if the speaker was someone to whom he was never married. See
supra, footnote 1. However, Ex-Husband may not prospectively enjoin Ex-Wife’s
speech through a petition to modify their Decree of Divorce. While Ex-Husband was not
asking for money damages, the only basis for his Petition to Modify was that Ex-Wife
had allegedly defamed him and invaded his privacy. This alone cannot act as the basis of
a petition to modify their Decree of Divorce. Accordingly, the district court properly
determined that Ex-Husband was improperly attempting to litigate tort claims in a
divorce proceeding and properly dismissed his Petition to Modify.
Moreover, Ex-Husband had not properly alleged any change in circumstances, let
alone one that would justify modifying the Decree of Divorce. The parties already had a
narrow, non-disparagement provision in their Decree of Divorce, which Ex-Wife had not
violated. The parties and the divorce court had therefore contemplated this specific issue
at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered, making it unavailable to serve as a basis to
modify the Decree of Divorce.
Finally, prior restraints on speech such as that requested by Ex-Husband in this case are
presumptively unconstitutional. Claims by spouses or ex-spouses seeking prospective injunctive
relief of adult-to-adult speech have been rejected across the country as unconstitutional. While
the district court did not rule on this issue, this Court should affirm the district court’s order on
the additional basis that Ex-Husband’s requested relief was an unconstitutional prior restraint.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PETITION TO
MODIFY.
A.

The District Court Correctly Concluded that Ex-Husband’s
Allegations Sounded in Tort and Dismissed the Petition to Modify.
1.

Divorce Courts do not Retain Jurisdiction Over the Parties Beyond Their
Marital Relationship.

When married persons divorce, they become legal strangers but for enforcement of the
terms of their decree of divorce. While divorce courts retain jurisdiction over the parties’
divorce to enforce or modify the decree, divorce courts do not retain jurisdiction to address every
dispute between formerly married persons forever. Any legal claims arising after the divorce,
particularly those that sound in tort, are addressed in civil courts just as if the parties had never
married.
In this regard, Utah law is clear that “[a]ctionable torts between married persons should
not be litigated in a divorce proceeding.” Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); accord Bayles v. Bayles, 1999 UT App 128, ¶ 14, 981 P.2d 403; Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d
1369 (Utah 1988). Utah law is equally clear that a petition to modify a decree of divorce is not a
proper vehicle to address alleged torts between ex-spouses. See Masters, 777 P.2d at 503 (“the
trial court correctly dismissed the fraud claim as being improperly raised in the petition for
modification of the divorce decree”).
Here, as in Masters and the other cases cited, Ex-Husband improperly attempted to use a
tort claim as an entrée to relief in a divorce case. While he may not have requested a jury trial or
that the divorce court award him damages, the crux of his allegations was that because Ex-Wife
had committed a tort, he was entitled to equitable relief from the divorce court. Ex-Husband has
never cited any authority for the argument that allegations of torts invoke the equitable powers of
9

the divorce courts and open the door to tort-related injunctive relief in divorce cases. Indeed, the
case law holds the opposite. See id. As such, his requested relief was properly denied by the
district court.
2.

Ex-Husband Takes Bayles Out of Context.

Ex-Husband cites one sentence from Bayles out of context to support his argument that
divorce courts should be the proper forum for tort cases. While Bayles does indeed state,
“divorce courts are free to address” tort claims, the entire context of that statement from Bayles
is:
Defendant’s allegations against plaintiff in support of his petition to modify sound
in tort. Although divorce courts are free to address them, actionable torts between
married persons should not be litigated in a divorce proceeding. A claim of fraud
is considered a tort, and thus is not properly addressed in a petition to modify a
divorce decree.
***
We hold that a claim of fraud, in almost every instance, is not properly addressed
in a petition to modify a divorce decree.
Bayles, 1999 UT App 128, ¶¶ 14, 20. The Bayles court was not inviting the litigation of tort
cases within divorce cases, nor was it stating that the allegation of a tort is the basis for
modification of a domestic order. Indeed, the Bayles holding is directly the opposite. See id.

B.

The District Court Correctly Concluded that Ex-Husband’s Petition to
Modify Failed to Allege a Proper Change in Circumstances.
1.

Ex-Husband Failed to Articulate Any Change in Circumstances in His
Petition to Modify.

“A party requesting that a divorce decree be modified must demonstrate that there has
been a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the entry of the decree that was not
contemplated in the decree itself.” Cantrell v. Cantrell, 2013 UT App 296, ¶ 19, 323 P.3d 586.
Here, Ex-Husband’s Petition to Modify did not specify a single change in circumstance. Rather,
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the Petition to Modify set forth the conclusion that, “there has been substantial and material
changes in circumstances since the entry of the Decree not contemplated in the Decree,” and then
followed with his requested relief. The Petition to Modify was properly dismissed on that basis
alone.3
2.

Possible Disparagement was Specifically Contemplated in the Decree of
Divorce.

Further, the matter about which Ex-Husband complained—Ex-Wife’s disparagement of
him—was specifically addressed by the Decree of Divorce at paragraph 22. Therefore, because
the disparagement issue was “contemplated in the decree itself,” alleged disparagement cannot
serve as a change in circumstances to modify the Decree of Divorce. See Cantrell, 2013 UT App
296, ¶ 19.

C.

The District Court’s Order Should be Affirmed on the Alternative
Ground of Unconstitutional Prior Restraint.

The United States Constitution and Utah Constitution both protect the free speech rights
of their citizens. U.S. Const. Amend. I; Utah Const. Art. I, Sect. 1. As to the Utah Constitution
specifically, Article I, Section 1 protects citizens’ free speech rights even more broadly than the
United States Constitution, protecting “the inherent and inalienable right” of citizens to “to
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions.” Moreover, both in Utah and under federal law,
prior restraints on speech are presumptively unconstitutional. Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom,
2003 UT 26, ¶ 14, 73 P.3d 334, 339 (“any system of prior restraint [on speech] comes to the
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity”) (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225 (1990)).

3

The district court was not required to allow Ex-Husband leave to amend. Even
assuming review of leave to amend was preserved for appellate review, the district court
properly concluded that amendment would be futile.
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In the context of divorce, state appellate courts across the country have rejected similar
claims by spouses or ex-spouses seeking injunctive relief as to adult-to-adult speech. See, e.g.,
In re Marriage of Candiotti, 34 Cal. App. 4th 718, 726 (Cal. 1995) (prior restraint on exspouse’s speech unconstitutional even if remarks are rude, unkind, motivated by hostility, or
even libelous) (emphasis added); Wutzel-Frez v. Frez, 2015 WL 6557830, at *8 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Oct. 1, 2015) (“a broad order limiting the defendant’s speech online is an impermissible prior
restraint on speech”); In re Marriage of Newell, 192 P.3d 529, 536 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008)
(restriction of father’s free speech rights by divorce court unconstitutional); In re Marriage of
Meredith, 201 P.3d 1056, 1062 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (prior restraint on speech in divorce case
unconstitutional). These cases recognize that although divorce courts may restrain speech to
children to further the best interests of those children, “impinging on a parent’s right to speak
about another adult, outside the presence of the children … constitutes undue prior restraint of
speech.” See In re Marriage of Candiotti, 34 Cal. App. 4th at 725.
Although any private party has the right to seek redress from the courts if he is the victim
of a tort by filing an action at law, requesting a broad and vague prior restraint of speech from a
divorce court is a vastly different and more problematic request. Ex-husband’s position before
the district court cannot survive the strict scrutiny of the United States and Utah constitutions.
Any interest he may have in being free from tortious activity can be (and must be) addressed in a
separate civil action. Thus, while the district court was correct in dismissing his petition and
denying his motion for injunctive relief, it could have and should have determined that the
requested relief would have amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
Ultimately, denial of injunctive relief was proper because the Petition to Modify
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was properly dismissed. For all the reasons supporting dismissal of the Petition to
Modify, including that any injunction would be unconstitutional, denial of injunctive
relief was also proper because Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)(4) requires that there be “a
substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim,
or the case presents serious issues on the merits which should be the subject of further
litigation.” Where a party does not have valid claims for relief in an underlying pleading,
preliminary relief necessarily fails as a matter of law.
Further, the district court also did not abuse its discretion in finding that ExHusband had failed to demonstrate a threat of immediate and irreparable harm warranting

injunctive relief. Ex-Husband had provided little more than conclusory allegations of fears of
harm. The district court was within its discretion to determine that Ex-Husband’s claims of harm
were merely speculative and that the high standard of a threat of immediate and irreparable

harm had not been met.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court should be affirmed.
Dated this 9th day of March, 2018.
LIEBERMAN SIEBERS, LLC
By:
[Electronically Signed]

Ben W. Lieberman
Attorney for Appellee
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: April 28, 2017
/s/ Ernie W. Jones
10:34:02 AM
District Court Judge

DRAFTED AND PROPOSED BY:
Ben W. Lieberman (Utah Bar #11456)
LIEBERMAN LAW FIRM
1371 East 2100 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801) 542-1820
E-mail: ben@bwllaw.com
Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH – OGDEN DIVISION
MARY ELLEN ROBERTSON,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL STEVENS,
Respondent.

ORDER ON OBJECTIONS TO
RECOMMENDATIONS OF
COMMISSIONER OF
DECEMBER 6, 2016,
AND MARCH 7, 2017
Civil No.
Judge
Commissioner

154901439
Jones
Wilson

This matter comes before the Court upon the objections by both Petitioner Mary Ellen
Robertson (“Petitioner”) and Respondent Michael Stevens (“Respondent”) to two
recommendations of The Honorable Christina L. Wilson, one recommendation orally made on
December 6, 2016 (the “December 6, 2016 Recommendation”), which was memorialized in a
written order entered December 20, 2016, and the other recommendation orally made on March
7, 2017 (the “March 7, 2017 Recommendation”), which was memorialized in a written order

April 28, 2017 10:34 AM
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entered March 27, 2017. Oral argument on all objections was held on April 5, 2017, before this
Court, with both parties present and represented by counsel. Based upon the submissions of the
parties and the arguments of counsel at the hearing, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1.

Respondent’s objection as to the December 6, 2016 Recommendation address the

denial of Respondent’s request for preliminary injunctive relief. The Court overrules the
objection and finds the request for preliminary injunctive relief was properly denied. The Court
finds that divorcing parties often say disparaging things about each other before, during and after
the divorce. Unless a party can show immediate and irreparable harm, a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction cannot be maintained. The Court finds there is no evidence that
Respondent lost his job or that there was a reduction in his income. It is not enough to allege
that the actions of Petitioner are damaging Respondent’s reputation unless there is some real
harm. The Court finds that Commissioner Wilson did not abuse her discretion in dissolving the
temporary restraining order and denying Respondent’s request for preliminary injunctive relief.
The Court finds that the divorce case is not the right forum to litigate what amounts to
allegations of a tort action.
2.

The Court overrules Petitioner’s objection as to the December 6, 2016

Recommendation as moot.
3.

Respondent’s objection as to the March 7, 2017 Recommendation addresses

Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. Commissioner Wilson recommended that Petitioner’s Motion to
Dismiss be granted on the basis of failure to allege a substantial and material change in
circumstances, but that Respondent be given leave to file an amended petition. The Court

2
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overrules the objection and finds there is not substantial and material change in circumstances
not contemplated at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered.
4.

Petitioner’s objection to the March 7, 2017 Recommendation is sustained in part

and overruled in part. Commissioner Wilson’s recommendation is modified to remove the
permission for leave file an amended petition. The Court finds that the allegations set forth in
the Petition to Modify amount to an allegation of tort claim and, therefore, the divorce action is
not the proper forum to litigate a tort claim. The Court finds the Commissioner abused her
discretion by granting leave of court to amend the Respondent's Verified Petition to Modify
Decree of Divorce. All other portions of Petitioner’s objection to the March 7, 2017
Recommendation are overruled.
5.

The Court does not address the arguments raised by Petitioner as to the

constitutionality of the relief requested by Respondent to restrict the speech of Petitioner.
6.

This case is DISMISSED. This is the final order of the Court and no further

order is required.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------THIS ORDER IS ELECTRONICALLY SIGNED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE ON THE
FIRST PAGE OF THE DOCUMENT AND ENTERED AS OF THE DATE.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------END OF ORDER
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Approved as to form:
/s David W. Read (with permission)
David W. Read
Counsel for Respondent
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